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Abstract. The role of Fiscal policy in the long run growth process has been crucial in 
macroeconomics since the appearance of endogenous growth models. Additionally, a 
significant debate among economists involves whether several types of spending or taxation 
enhance economic growth. The main objective of this paper is to highlight the relationship 
between fiscal policy and economic growth in the EU-15, and make an attempt to 
determine which of the fiscal policy instruments enhance economic growth.We deployed 
panel data techniques and included both sides of budget, spending and taxation, in our 
regressions and used the most recent dataset data for fiscal variables from Eurostat. We 
made a new classification of public expenditures into homogeneous groups in order to 
reduce the explanatory variables and increase the efficiency of our model and results since 
we have data for only 14 years. In our empirical analysis we included OLS, fixed effects 
models, random effects models and GMM estimators, the Arellano & Bond (1991) and the 
Arellano & Bover (1995) - Blundell & Bond (1998) estimators.On the first round of our 
regressions we find a negative impact of spending on human capital accumulation on 
economic growth. Our empirical results also indicate that an increase on government 
spending on infrastructure has a significant positive impact on the economy growth of a 
country. Additionally, in our regressions the variable government spending on property 
rights protections include spending on defence and spending on public order safety. Our 
empirical results from the first round of regressions imply a strongly negative relationship 
between these two variables. However, on the second round of our regressions we 
aggregate defence spending from spending on property right protection and we did not find 
any relationship between economic growth and defence spending. Moreover, we found a 
non-significant relationship between government spending on social protection and 
economic growth. On the second round of regressions, when we allow for non-linear 
growth effects we find a positive relationship with deficits and economic growth, which is 
in contrast with Ricardian Equivalence. We also included the employment growth and 
business investment in our model because labour and capital are very important factors of 
production in growth models. In our empirical results we do not find a significant impact of 
employment on economic growth, but when we allow for non-linear growth effects we find 
a strongly positive impact. However, we found that gross fixed capital formation of the 
private sector as a percentage of GDP in both rounds of our regressions, has no significant 
impact on economic growth. Finally, our empirical results do not support any evidence of 
relationship between openness and economic growth. 
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1. Introduction 
he The role of Fiscal policy in the long run growth process has been crucial 
in macroeconomics since the appearance of endogenous growth models. 
Kongsamut et al. (2001) implied that the endogenous growth models or 
balanced growth models are used extensively in macroeconomics because they are 
consistent with the Kaldor (1960) facts regarding to economic growth. The Kaldor 
facts are the followings: Per capita output rate is approximately constant, the 
capital-output ratio is approximately constant, the real rate of return to capital is 
approximately constant and the shares of labour and capital in national income are 
approximately constant.According to Afonso & Alegre (2007) the role of fiscal 
policies on economic growth has driven several studies both on the theoretical and 
empirical fronts. Governments need to acknowledge whether their public activities 
serve as an incentive to growth or if they pose an obstacle, since the development 
of appropriate fiscal policies could lead to a persistent increase of economic 
growth. 
A significant debate among economists (Levine & Renelt, 1992; Folster & 
Henrekson, 2001; Kneller, Bleaney & Gemmel, 2001; Barro & Sala-i Martin, 
2004) involves whether several types of spending or taxation enhance economic 
growth. In addition, the global recession and financial crisis, especially during the 
last 2 years, produced new interests and disagreements in the Fiscal policy in 
European Union countries. Nowadays, the public finances of most countries in the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) are in the worst position since the industrial 
revolution.  
The main objective of this paper is to highlight the relationship between fiscal 
policy and economic growth in the EU-15, and make an attempt to determine 
which of the fiscal policy instruments enhance economic growth. However, there 
are several difficulties in order to examine whether there is support of endogenous 
or neoclassical growth models. Firstly, there are limited data (only 14 years) on 
government spending and taxation for European Union countries and more 
specifically in the dissagregation level required for our analysis. The limited data is 
one of the reasons that we could not apply a model for individual countries such as 
Greece. During 1990s the majority of European Union countries made the decision 
to give up their national currencies, and used a new currency the euro. European 
Monetary Union have joined by 12 countries (Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland and Greece) 
and adopted euro as its common currency. The decision of European leaders for a 
single European currency made at 1979 when the members of European Union set 
up the European Monetary System (EMS).  
A common problem of many studies that examined the relationship between 
economic growth and fiscal policy is that they do not pay attention to separate the 
effects of fiscal policy on the transition from them on steady-state. Benos (2005) 
claimed that this separation is essential, since the difference between neoclassical 
and endogenous growth models are their predictions about the long-run effects of 
policy. Most of the existing literature is based on cross section or panels of five-
year averages and according to Knerrel et al. (2001) it allows only for the 
contemporaneous effects within each five year period. He claimed that five-year 
averaged data are insufficient to capture the long-run effects of fiscal policy and 
that longer lags are required. Finally, the endogeneity of regressors in growth 
equations does not take into account the effects of fiscal policy on growth. Knerrel 
et al. (2001) attempted to answer the question if faster growth induce larger 
government expenditures and taxes (via Wagner’s law), or vice versa, or bothi. 
T 
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However, according to Benos (2005) the empirical results do not change even if 
these reggressors are taken into account. 
In this paper we used panel data techniques because they offer several 
advantages over cross-section and time series analysis. First of all, panel data refer 
to data which contains time series observations of a number of individuals, 
consequently these observations involve at least two dimensions: a cross sectional 
dimension and a time series dimensional. According to Baltagi (1996) panel data 
refers to the pooling of observations on a cross section of countries, firms, 
households, etc. over time periods. It can be achieved by surveying a number of 
individuals (countries) and following them over time. Hsiao (2003) argued that 
when time series data are non-stationary, the large sample estimation of the 
distributions of the least-squares or maximum likelihood estimators are no longer 
normally distributed, (e.g. Dickey & Fuller, 1979; Phillips & Durlauf, 1986). 
However, if panel data are available, and observations between cross-sectional 
units are not dependent, subsequently someone can apply the central limit theorem 
across cross-sectional units to explain that the limiting distributions of many 
estimators stay asymptotically normal (Levin, Lin & Chu, 2002; Phillips & Moon, 
1999). Panel data analysis allows for more accurate inference of model parameters 
and usually contain more degrees of freedom and more sample variability than time 
series and cross section data, hence improving the efficiency of econometric 
estimates (Hsiao, Mountain & Hollman, 1995). In our case we want increase the 
efficiency of our model and results since we have data for only 14 years. 
Additionally, we control the impact of omitted variables. Hsiao (2003) stated 
that it is regularly implied that the most common reason that researchers find (or do 
not find) specific effects, is because they ignore the impacts of certain variables in 
the model specification which are related with the incorporated explanatory 
variables. Panel data include informations on the intertemporal dynamics and the 
independence of the entities might allow one to control the impacts of missing or 
unobserved variables. With panel data, we can rely on the inter-individual 
differences to reduce the collinearity between current and lag variables to estimate 
unrestricted time-adjustment patterns (Pakes & Griliches, 1984). Generate more 
accurate predictions for individual outcomes by pooling the data instead of 
generating predictions of individual outcomes using the individual data (Hsiao, 
Appelbe & Dineen, 1993). 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Previous theoretical work 
Many authors examined the predictions of these theoretical models; however, 
their results do not following a common pattern. Many studies used cross-country 
regressions to search for a linkage between economic, political and institutional 
factors with long-run economic growth. For instance, Landau (1983), Barro (1990), 
Barro (1991) and Feder (1983) examined the relationship between fiscal policy and 
economic growth but excluded the trade indicators, while Edwards (1989) tested 
the trade policy with economic growth but excluded the fiscal indicators. However, 
there are studies such as Kormendi & Mequire (1985) which included both trade 
and fiscal factors and probably obtained more accurate empirical results. 
Levine & Renelt (1992) used data for 119 countries during the period of 1960-
1989 (but exclude the oil exporters) and examined whether the conclusions from 
existing studies are robust or fragile to small changes in the set of control variables. 
They stated that ―many candidate regressions have equal theoretical status, but the 
estimated coefficients on the variables of interest in these regressions may depend 
importantly on the conditioning set of information‖ (Levine & Renelt, 1992). 
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Finally they found a positive, robust relationship among economic growth and 
investment as a share of GDP, as well as between investment and international 
trade as a share of GDP.  
Knerrel et al. (1999) followed Helms (1985)
ii
 among others and showed that 
studies which do not take into account both sides of the budget suffer from 
substantial biases of the coefficient estimates. Agell et al. (1997) used data from 23 
OECD countries during the period of 1970-1990 and found that the relationship 
between the average annual growth rate and tax revenues as a share of GDP is 
negative. On the other hand, when they incorporated the initial GDP per capita and 
the share of population younger than 15 and older than 65 as explanatory variables, 
the relationship among economic growth and taxes was positive. Finally, 
Devarajan et al. (1996) and Easterly & Rebello (1993) tested only the expenditure 
side. 
In the past, many economists (Solow, 1956; Cass, 1965) suggested that growth 
was a function of exogenous factors to government policy such as technological 
progress and population. After 1980s, authors such as Romer (1986; 1990), Lucas 
(1988) and Barro (1990) made an attempt to endogenise the growth rate of output. 
They presented the importance and mechanisms by which some policy variables 
affect not only the growth rate but also the steady-state growth rates. It is important 
to mention that, Barro (1990) made one of the first attempts to endogenise the 
relationship between fiscal policies and economic growth. He made a distinction of 
productive-unproductive government spending and distortionary-non distortionary 
taxation. 
2.2. Exogenous growth models 
The basic neoclassical growth models was developed during 1950’s  and 
assumed that an economic policy that allows consumers to save more, provide 
higher levels of education, drive more investments in infrastructure and generate 
additional job opportunities,  will ultimately enhance economic growth. This was 
the starting point of many discussions and debates between economists regarding 
the relationship of fiscal policy and economic growth. The neoclassical model 
highlighted the importance of savings and capital formation for growth, in both 
short and medium term perspective, while the growth in the long run is constant 
and is not dependent on the savings ratio. In the long run, the economic growth is 
determined by exogenous to the model factors, such as technological change and 
population growth. 
According to Agell et al. (1997), the neoclassical model explains why economic 
policy can change the level of the long-term growth path, and that appropriate 
policies shift the path upwards, while inappropriate policies shift this path 
downwards. On the other hand, the slope of the path is unaffected and suggested 
that the differences between countries in economic and political institutions has 
very limited value in explaining persistent differences across countries.  
Jorgenson & Yun (1986) used annual data of the U.S economy for the period 
1955-1980 and examined the impact of the U.S tax policy on the efficiency of 
capital allocation. They used a model of the provisions of the U.S. tax law 
applicable to income from capital and concluded that there will be dramatic gains 
in economic welfare if there will be a shift from direct taxation (taxation of income 
from capital) to indirect (taxation through a consumption-base tax). Jorgenson & 
Jun (1990) found that the largest welfare gains from tax reform will be obtained by 
transferring part of the tax burden on business capital to household capital or 
replace tax system with a new one based on consumption. 
Barro (1990) and Benos (2005; 2009) implied that the latter models classify the 
fiscal instruments into four categories: 
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 Distortionary taxation, which reduces the growth through the weakness of 
the incentives to invest in physical/human capital. 
 Non-distortionary taxation, which does not affect the incentives to invest, 
hence not reducing growth. 
 Productive expenditures, which increases growth, through positive 
externalities (education spending). 
 Unproductive expenditures, which does not affect the marginal product and 
growth, but boosts household utility directly. 
2.3. Predictions of endogenous models 
Several studies have applied endogenous growth models with fiscal policy and 
indicating evidence that public goods are productive is stock and/or in flow 
(Turnonsky, 1997; Tsoukis & Miller, 2003; Ghosh & Roy, 2004;  Agenor, 2008). 
Futagami et al. (1993) introduced the stock of public capital as a purely public 
good that affects the productivity of firms in Barro’s (1990) model. They examined 
a decentralized economy and found that it features transitional dynamics, in 
contrast to models in which public expenditure enters production as a flow, when 
the economy is always on its balanced growth path. Turnovsky (1997) extends the 
model of Futagami et al. (1993) to consider overcrowding and a more complete 
range of fiscal instruments.  
An investigation of the role of fiscal policy when combined (non-utility-
enhancing) public services balance private capital in production is made by 
Tsoukis & Miller (2003). They also examined the optimal tax/spending rate and its 
allocation between flow expenditures (such as payment of salaries in education, 
health and justice) and public investment to enhance infrastructure in the same 
sectors. They stated that their paper ―confirms the importance of such a policy 
prescription and fiscal policy more generally for growth and societal welfare. The 
significance of the Barro rule ultimately lies in its being a normative criterion, 
against which existing policy practices can be evaluated. For instance, earlier work 
of our own has found evidence of seriously suboptimal employment of fiscal policy 
in the world economy‖ (Tsoukis & Miller, 2003). 
The study of Ghosh & Roy (2004) tested the fiscal policy, long-run growth and 
welfare in a stock-flow model of public goods. Moreover, they introduced public 
capital and public services as inputs in an endogenous growth model. Their 
empirical results support the view that growth rate is subject to the distribution of 
tax revenues among the accumulation of public capital and the provision of public 
services. Finally, they stated that ―the latter policy tool can be used not only to 
affect the rate of the economy’s growth but also to partially bridge the divergence 
between equilibrium and optimum‖ (Ghosh  & Roy, 2004). 
The optimal allocation of goevrnment spending between health and 
infrastructure was tested by Agenor (2008) in an endogenous growth framework. 
An important characteristic of his model was that infrastucture had an impact not 
only in the production of goods but in addition to the supply of health services. He 
illustrated that there is a trade-off in growing government expenditures on 
infrastructure: it raise the share of infrastructure services to production of both 
goods and health services, which boost growth. However, it reduses the resources 
allocated to health and reduce productivity, hence decline growth. There was 
evidence that the long-run impact on steady-state growth is uncertain, because it 
depends on the various parameters of the economy, a revenue-neutral increase in 
spending on infrastructure which can in fact decline the growth rate. The growth-
maximizing tax rate was illustrated to be time with to the summary of the 
elasticities of output with regard to infrastructure services and effective labour, 
while the optimal allocation of spending among health and infrastructure was based 
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on the factors that characterized the technology for producing goods and health 
services. 
Other authors focused on whereas differents forms of spending are productive 
(Glomm & Ravikumar, 1992; Karaganovich & Zilcha, 1999; Zagler & Durnecker, 
2003; Gomez, 2008) and investigated the relationship between education, social 
security and economic growth in the long run. They examined the role of 
government’s allocation of tax revenues between two expenditure functions, public 
investment in education (a transfer to the young generation) and social security 
benefits to the older generation. They implied that more resources should be shifted 
to education needs and there is a necessity of examination in models with 
heterogenous families and consideration of fully-funded social security system as 
an alternative. 
Zagler & Durnecker (2003) tested the relationship between economic growth 
and fiscal policy, and presented a unifying framework for the analysis of long run 
growth implications of government expenditures and revenues. They divided the 
expenditures into productive and unproductive (where the unproductive have an 
impact on economic growth). There was evidence that education expenditures and 
the growth rate of public infrastructure investment have a positive impact on 
economic growth. They also included in the examination the  taxation and found 
that several tax rates, such as taxes on savings, on intermediate input goods, on 
research and development expenditures, a tax on profit income and a tax on 
manufacturing labour, have a direct influence in the division of labour between the 
manufacturing sector and the research and development sector. Thus, alter the 
innovation and increase the growth rate. 
The effect of public investment in an endogenous growth model with private, 
public physical capital, and human capital is observed by Gomez (2008). He found 
evidence that long-run growth is invariant to fiscal policy and that an increase in 
absolute congestion reduces the long-run growth, while relative congestion does 
not affect growth. Similarly, Ortiqueira (1998) presented an endogenous growth 
model with physical and human capital accumulation and investigated the 
implication of tax policies. The empirical results supported the view that capital 
income taxation plays a crucial role along the convergence to the balanced growth 
path.  
Finally, Glomm & Ravikumar (1992), Chang (1998) included assymetric 
equilibria ex-post. Glomm & Ravikumar (1992) examined the implications of 
public investment in human capital on growth and the evolution of income 
inequality in an economy in which individuals have different income and skill 
levels. They applied a model where the human capital investment through fromal 
schooling is the engine of growth. They implied that income inequality decreased 
more rapidly under public education, private education acquiesces greater per 
capita incomes except the initial income inequality is suffuciently high. Finally, 
societies will choose public education if a majority of agents have incomes below 
average.  
Chang (1998) investigated the establishment of the rate of growth in an 
economy in which we have the presence of two political parties. The political 
parties represent different social classes, while they settle the magnitude and 
allocation of taxation. He implied that if taxes finance public services may increase 
growth, but when taxes used to redistribute income between classes, the economic 
growth is reduced. Different social classes have different indications about growth 
and distribution, this disagreement is resolved through tax negotiations between 
political parties 
On the other hand, Turnovsky (1996) checked the link between fiscal policy, 
adjustment costs and endogenous growth. He developed a one-sector endogenous 
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growth model in which investment incurs convex adjustment costs (while in the 
previous studies investment being determined residually). Government uses the tax 
revenues to finance productive expenditures and assumed that these expenditures 
have impact on productivity of the existing capital stock and on the costs of 
installing new capital. He implied that the adjustment costs play a crucial role in 
the determination of optimal fiscal policy. These costs decrease the impacts of 
capital taxes on economic growth and increase the productive government 
spending under lump-sum tax financing to enhance growth. He suggested that 
while government adjustment costs are responsive to productive government 
spending, the welfare maximizing level of the spending will now be not as much as 
the growth-maximizing level.  
Likewise, Zhang (2000) examined the assumption that the production function 
displays social constant return to scale, by creating a simple model with public 
inputs. The dynamics that generated from his model do not arise with constant 
returns. He also noted two features for the case of moderate increasing returns: 
Firstly, the dynamic path diverges from an interior equilibrium in expanding 
oscillations, suggesting that self-fulflling expectations play an essential role in 
determining the long-run position of the economy. Secondly, economic cycles take 
place, which mean that the endogenous government spending is also periodic when 
the system in the neighbourhood of the equilibrium.  
Cazzavillan (1996) used a simple one-sector model of capital accumulation; 
endowed with inelastic labour supply in which the public goods create positive 
externalities in both production and consumption (he followed the models of 
Arrow & Kurz (1970) and Barro (1990)). The results of the increasing returns are 
the perpetual and indeterminacy growth of the economy and hence endogenous 
stochastic growth fluctuations. 
The conjection effects attracted the interest of Eicher & Turnovsky (2000), Ott 
& Turnovsky (2006). Eicher & Turnovsky (2000) made a one-sector non-scale 
growth model and tested the relationship of conjection, returns on scale and 
economic growth. He introduced two notions of conjection: the aggregate 
conjection (which reduces the effective productivity of capital) and relative 
conjection (which reduces the effective productivity of labour). They found 
supportive evidence that both forms of conjection affect the economic growth. 
Ott & Turnovsky (2006) tested the role of excludability by introducing 
excludable and non-excludable inputs into an endogenous growth model. Their 
empirical results provide evidence about the role of conjection in determining the 
optimal structure and the consequences for the government budget. He claimed that 
if congestion is not arising; a user fee set at marginal cost yields the optimal 
amount of the excludable public input, while the non-excludable input must be 
financed via a growth neutral tax.  
Kneller et al. (1999) concluded that the equation that estimated from most of the 
researchers that tested the relationship between economic growth and fiscal policy 
is the following: 
 
𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 +  𝑏𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 𝐸𝑖𝑡 +   𝑐𝑗 − 𝑐𝑖 𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑙−1
𝑗=1     (1) 
 
They supposed that 𝑔𝑖𝑡  is the growth rate of a country i at time t is a function of 
conditioning (non-fiscal) variables, 𝐸𝑖𝑡 , and a vector of  fiscal variables 𝐹𝑖𝑡 . 
Moreover, a represent the constant term of the non fiscal variable i, while the b 
represents the slope of coefficient of the same variable (there are k such variables). 
Additionally, 𝑐𝑗  is the coefficient of the growth impact of the fiscal variable 𝐹𝑖𝑡  
(there are l-1 such variables), and finally 𝑐𝑖  measures the effect on growth of the lth 
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fiscal variable, which finances the change in one of the l-1 fiscal policy 
instruments. 
From the equation (1) we can see that the standard hypothesis test of a zero 
coefficient of Fit , and is in fact testing the null hypothesis that cj − ci=0 rather 
thancj = 0. According to Kneller et al. (1999) the correct analysis of the coefficient 
on each fiscal category is as the effect of a unit change in the relevant variable 
offset by a unit change in the omitted category, which is the implicit financing 
element. 
2.4. Previous empirical work 
The first generation of studies made by economists, political scientists and 
sociologists, used bivariate regression analysis, possibly expanded by some 
individual control variable. Katz et al. (1983) used cross country data for 22 
developed countries and tested the impact of taxes on growth and distribution. 
They found that fiscal instruments (especially personal income taxes) can lead to 
better income equality but on the other hand there exists automatic trade-off 
between an active public sector and a dynamic expanding economy. 
Korpi (1985) examined 17 capitalist countries (for the period 1950-1973) into 
the relationship of economic growth and welfare state. Their empirical results do 
not give any support that an increased public sector expands the welfare state 
programs, but lower income inequality, or higher potentials for political and 
organizational penetration into markets, and have negative effect on product and 
productivity growth. 
According to Agell (1997) the second generation of studies tightened the 
methodological requirements, and the main tool of their studies was a relatively 
systematic multivariate regression analysis, which was combined with a more 
developed statistical testing methodology.  
The study of Kormendi & Mequire (1985) used cross section data for 47 
countries on total government consumption expenditures and other variables 
exclude public investment and transfers but includes education and defence. They 
did not find any relationship between average growth rates of real GDP and 
average growth rates of the government consumption spending as a share of GDP 
for the post –World WAR II period.  
In accordance, Marlow (1986) tested the relationship between economic growth 
and public sector by using cross country data for 19 industrialized countries during 
the period of 1960-1980. Their empirical evidence supports the view that the size 
of public sector has a negative impact on economic growth. They also stated that 
the initial level of the public sector share in the economy and the share of social 
expenditures have also a negative impact on economic growth. 
Before the construction of the relevant endogenous growth models many 
researchers since early 1980’s investigated the relationship between fiscal policy 
and economic growth. Landau (1983) used cross section data of 104 countries  and 
found  negative correlation among the government consumption spending as a 
share of GDP and the rate of growth per capita GDP for six sub-periods. He 
suggested that government spendingmight help increase economic welfare even if 
it decreases the growth of per capita GDP.  Furthermore, the relationship between 
the level of per capita GDP in the initial year of the period and economic growth 
was negative (against predictions due to the fact that most of the countries had low 
income). Finally, he found positive relationship between the growth rate and total 
investment in education. 
Ram (1986b) derived an equation for economic growth from two separate 
productions functions, one for the public sector and one for the non-government 
sector. He implied that is difficult not to conclude that the government size has a 
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positive effect on economic growth and performance. He found evidence that there 
was a harmony between the results from both of techniques that used (cross section 
and time series) and that the externality effect of government size is always 
positive. Finally, after the comparison of the two sectors he found that the 
productivity in public sector was higher (especially in 1960’s).  
The study of Landau (1986) used cross section and time series in order to assess 
the impact of a wide variety of government expenditure variables. He did not 
include only measures of government expenditure but also human, physical capital 
variables, historical-political factors, the level of per capita product, geo-climatic 
factors.  
A debate involving the results of Landau & Ram started when Rao (1989) 
commented on both previous studies and claimed that Ram’s model had a better 
theoretical foundation compared with multiple regression of Landau, but on the 
other hand Landau used a variety of expenditures variables that Ram did not. 
Furthermore, he made a re-examination of Ram’s model and found that Ram 
assumptions had not been adequately established and that there was no strong basis 
to separate the economic growth into productivity and externality. Finally he 
concluded that Ram found a positive relationship due to specification problems. 
Carr (1989) also argued that the results of Ram had statistical data problems 
(spurious). However, Ram (1989) claimed that the comments of Carr (1989) and 
Rao (1989) did not significantly alter his results in the study of 1986 and concluded 
that the relationship between government size and growth is positive. 
Grier & Tullock (1989) extended the analysis of Kormendi & Manquire (1985) 
on government consumption spending and some other variables that they took from 
Summers & Helston (1994). Their analysis supported the view that there is a 
significant negative relationship between the growth of real GDP and the growth of 
government share of GDP. 
A new approach applied by Barro (1990; 1991), who tested the impacts of 
government consumption and taxation in economic growth. In his cross country 
analysis found that both, saving and growth rates fall with an increase in non-
productive government service spending. Both rates had increased with productive 
government expenditures but subsequently declined (1990). He claimed that the 
coefficient of the non-productive government service spending to the average 
annual growth rate of per capita GDP is negative.  
The third generation of studies has attained a new level of reflection and 
methodological sophistication. Helms (1985) used annual data for 48 states for the 
period 1965-1979 and used as explanatory variables taxes, public expenditures and 
demographic and labour force characteristics. The key feature of this approach was 
that he recognized that is meaningful to evaluate the effects of expenditures or 
taxes in isolation and claimed that both the sources and the uses of funds must be 
considered. 
Conte & Darrat (1988) made a re-examination of the link between economic 
growth and growing public sector for 22 OECD countries for the period 1960-
1984. He used the Granger causality approach to test if there is causal relationship 
between the two variables. They found evidence that the impact of expanding 
public sector on economic growth is mixed.  
Additionally, Alexander (1990) used data for 13 OECD countries and tried to 
determine the relationship between the major macroeconomic aggregates and 
economic growth. He concluded that the growth rate of the ratio of government 
spending to GDP, the ratio of money supply to GDP and inflation have a negative 
impact to economic growth, while the growth rates of the ratio of the deficit to 
GDP has no significant impact on growth. 
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The empirical examination of Easterly & Rebello (1993) used cross country 
data for 100 countries for the period 1970-1988 and panel data for 28 countries for 
the period 1870-1988 and investigated the link between economic growth and 
fiscal policy. They found that public transportation, communicational and 
educational investments have a positive impact on economic growth, while 
aggregate public investment has negative. However, they implied that the 
relationship between economic growth and fiscal variables is fragile and is a result 
of multicollinearity. Moreover fiscal variables tend to be highly correlated with the 
level of income in the beginning of the period and highly correlated among them. 
They found no significant differences in the fiscal policies adopted by democracies 
and non-democracies (once they controlled the level of income). Hsieh & Lai 
(1994) examined the interactions between the growth rate in per capita real GDP, 
the share of government spending and the ratio of private investment of GDP for 7 
countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom and the United 
States). They found that government do not have any effect in growth. 
Likewise, Lin (1994) investigated the relationship between economic growth 
and government spending in developed and non-developed countries based on 
single and simultaneous equations and found that the government size has a 
positive impact on economic growth in the short-run but not in the medium run. He 
claimed that capital and labour stock have a positive effect on economic growth 
and that there is a significant structure difference between the developed and less 
developed countries with respects to the impacts of non-productive government 
expenditures (exclude the military and education expenditures). 
At the same time, Devarajan et al. (1996) used data of 43 developing countries 
over a period of 20 years. They established that a raise in current spending will 
have positive and significant growth effects. There was also evidence that the 
correlation between the capital component of productive spending and the 
economic growth per-capita is negative.  
A synthesis of published articles for the period 1983-1998 presented by Poot 
(2000) and tested the relationship economic growth and government policies. Five 
policy areas considered in his study: education, military, infrastructure spending, 
tax rates and general government consumption. He claimed that there is a positive 
relationship with education and infrastructure spending and economic growth. He 
didn’t find any evidence of interaction between government consumption and 
growth, while the link between defence spending and growth seems to be strongly 
negative. Finally, he found empirical evidence of negative growth effect of tax and 
suggested that the potential endogeneity of fiscal variables can be resolved through 
the selection of appropriate variables. 
Finally, the last generation of studies consisted by several studies that tested the 
relationship between economic growth and fiscal variables. Angelopoulos & 
Philippopoulos (2005) investigated the relationship between fiscal policy and 
economic growth for Greece in the period 1960-2000. They found that a smaller 
public sector is good for growth and that it is very important to see not only the 
size but the quality and efficiency. When they used the government consumption 
share in GDP to measure the public sector found the negative relationship (growth-
public sector). However, when they used for measurement the total government 
expenditures or the tax revenues the results were not significant. They implied that 
only public investment and wages-salaries affect significantly the growth rate, 
while other expenditures do not affect the growth. Finally they used regressions to 
explain the quality of public sector and implied that bigger public sectors decline 
growth. 
In addition, the empirical examination of Gupta et al. (2005) used data of 39 
low income countries during the period 1990-2000 and tested the effects of fiscal 
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policy and expenditure composition on economic growth. They found that fiscal 
consolidations were not harmful for short and long-run growth and that there is a 
significant correlation between fiscal adjustment and economic growth. A shift of 
public spending to more productive uses is very important to boost economic 
growth, while the reduction of public sector wage bill will not decrease the growth. 
One very important factor that affects the economic growth in low income 
countries were the composition of deficit finance and concluded that changes 
derived from declining the  domestic financing, have 1½ times the impact on 
growth as changes derived from reducing domestic and external financing. 
In accordance, Schaltegger & Torgler (2006) used panel data and found a 
negative relationship between the government size and economic growth. They 
stated that this happened only in rich countries with a large public sector and not in 
developing countries. They examined the government spending of the operational 
budget separately from the impact of investment spending and from the capital 
budget. They stated that an increase in public spending operating budgets has a 
negative impact on growth while capital budgets do not have significant impact on 
growth. Likewise, Afonso & Alegre (2007) used panel data of 27 European Union 
countries for the period 1970-2006 and tested whether a reallocation of government 
budget items can boost the long-term GDP growth. They used three alternative 
dependent variables: economic growth, total factor productivity and labour 
productivity. Their empirical results suggest a negative impact of social security 
and public consumption on economic growth, while public investment boosts 
economic growth. Moreover there is a negative impact of health and social 
protection expenditures on production and the positive effect of increasing public 
spending to education. Finally they concluded that ―the decomposition of public 
expenditure attending to the level of government could also yield interesting 
results, since the level of fiscal decentralisation and structures are still very 
heterogeneous in our set of European countries‖ (Afonso & Alegre, 2007). 
Angelopoulos et al. (2007) used a panel data of 23 OECD countries and made 
an endogenous growth model in order to examine the growth effects of the 
composition of government expenditure and tax burden for the period 1970-2000.  
They found that these countries could improve their economic growth with a 
reallocation of public expenditures towards productive activities. They claimed that 
labour income tax rates have negative relationship with economic growth, while 
capital income and corporate income tax rates have positive (tax reform is needed). 
Finally, Romero-Avila and Strauch (2008) investigated the relationship between 
public finances and economic growth in the European Union-15 during the period 
of 1960-2001. The main findings from their empirical results were that the 
expenditure side of the budget affect the long run economic growth over the 
business cycle. More specifically they stated that the impact of government size 
and government consumption to economic growth is negative, while the public 
investment boosts economic growth. On the revenue side, they found negative 
impact of direct taxation on economic growth and on physical capital 
accumulation. 
The relationship between fiscal policy instruments and economic growth cannot 
be investigated without theories and an appropriate time series or panel data set, 
incorporated with the most recent econometric techniques. According to Landau 
(1986) ―there are virtually no empirical studies of the general impact of 
government on economic growth. An extensive literature search turned up only 
three papers‖ (Landau, 1986, pp. 35). 
A very important weakness of previous studies, which made the attempt to 
analyse the impact of public or taxation on economic growth of a country, is that 
they did not take into account the government budget constraint. Kochelakorta & 
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Yi (1997) point out the importance of including the government budget constraint 
into the analysis, because failure to incorporate it leads to inconclusive empirical 
results. 
2.5. Government spending on social protection 
Government spending on social protection can have a positive impact on 
economic growth of a country through many channels. Firstly, government funds 
can used in order to finance the health or education systems, encourage risk taking, 
and promote participation of individuals in the labour market. Additionally, if tax-
payers realise that when government revenues increased, more funds will be used 
on social protection, they will have less incentive to work and save. Furthermore, 
increased government spending on social protection may lead to a more stable 
environment when there is a reduction on poverty and inequality.  
In the literature, the previous studies that examined the relationship between 
government spending on social protection and economic growth, advocated mixed 
results. Cashin (1995), Belletini & Ceroni (2000), Cashin (1994), Castles & 
Dowrick (1990), Korpi (1985), McCallum & Blais (1987) and Perotti (1992; 1994) 
implied a positive relationship between social spending and growth. 
Atkinson (1999) made a survey on literature and found mixed results for the 
relationship between the size of welfare state and growth, while Bleaney et al. 
(2001) included the social spending in unproductive spending and found 
insignificant effect on growth. According to Mirlees (1971) if social protection 
spending discourages people to work, there will be a reduction in the workforce, 
hence there will be a reduction on national output. He also mentioned that the 
reduction of savings will also affect the available capital for re-investment. These 
results have been in contrast with Gwartney et al. (1998), Hansson & Henrekson 
(1994), Atkinson (1999), Nördstrom (1992) and Weede (1986b; 1991).  
2.6. Openness and economic growth 
The relationship between trade opens and economic growth is one of the most 
debated issues in economics, since this relationship is highly complex. The 
empirical results of endogenous models are diversified and do not have common 
pattern on their results (Romer, 1990; Rivera-Batiz & Romer, 1991). Additionally, 
probably one reason for mixed results is the specific country factors such as 
different technologies across different countries (Young, 1991; Lucas, 1988).  
Romer (1990) examined the relationship between export volumes and economic 
growth for a number of industrialized countries. He found a strong positive 
correlation between these variables. However, he included only exports and clearly 
excluded the impacts of imports. Ram (1989) found that imports are positively 
correlated with economic growth; however, he did not include exports.   
Previous studies of Krueger (1978) and Feder (1983), applied time series data 
and examined the relationship between openness and growth suffered from 
methodogical problems, since they applied Granger causality tests without firstly 
provided a unit root tests for stationarity. 
One of the most important problems of examining the relationship between 
trade and economic growth is the measurement of openness. The most common 
method is introducing the variable of total trade volume to GDP which is equal 
with total exports minus total imports. However, especially in OLS estimation 
there is a possibility of obtaining biased and inconsistent results due to endogeneity 
of the trade volume. Thus, some authors (Pritchett, 1994) applied a measure of 
trade policies. 
2.6. Infrastructure spending and economic growth 
The majority of previous studies such as Ratner (1983), Easterly & Rebelo 
(1993), Kocherlakota & Yi (1997), Lau & Sin (1997), Kneller et al. (1999), 
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Angelopoulos et al. (2007) and Benos (2009),  examined the impact of government 
spending on infrastructure and found positive impact on growth. There are two 
different strands of literature in this topic, the first one apply the flow of 
government expenditures on infrastructure and the second one compares the 
productivity of public capital (roads airports), with the private capital. Thus, it is 
very difficult to make generalisation across different countries and future research 
is warranted in both types of government expenditures. 
Easterly & Rebelo (1993) found a positive impact of investment in transport 
and communication on economic growth. Canning et al. (1994) found evidence 
which support a positive impact of telephones on economic growth. Similarly, 
Sanchez-Robles (1998) found a positive effect of road length and electricity 
generating capacity in growth. On the other hand, there are several studies (Hulten 
& Schwab, 1991; Tatom, 1991; Tatom, 1993; Holtz-Eakin, 1994; Garcia-Mila, 
McGuire & Porter, 1996) which found little evidence that infrastructure enhance 
growth. 
2.7. Taxes and economic growth 
Many studies have focused on the correlation between tax rates and economic 
growth. These studies can be divided in two categories: assessments of the 
magnitudes of tax costs and statistical analyses of the relationship between tax rates 
and growth.  Taxation has a negative or positive impact on economic growth. The 
negative impact (Helms, 1985; Gale & Potter, 2002) occurs from the distortions to 
choice and the disincentive effects. The positive impact according to Katz et al. 
(1983) arises indirectly through the expenditures financed by taxation. The 
endogenous growth models with a public good as an input, provide a positive 
channel through growth. However, this relationship is not monotonic, because 
increases in the tax rate above the optimum level would reduce the growth rate.  
The first attempt to examine the growth effects of taxation made by Solow 
(1956). In his growth model he assumed that the growth is not affected by tax 
policy. However, Romer (1986) made another growth model in which government 
spending and tax policies may have a long-run impact of economic growth. 
Devereux & Love (1994) analysed the effects of income and expenditure 
taxation in a two-sector endogenous growth model which allowing for endogenous 
labour supply. They explored the quantitative and qualitative effects of tax changes 
on growth and welfare in a growth model with growth arising from human and 
physical capital. They found that capital income, wage and consumption taxes have 
a negative impact on economic growth. Finally they concluded that the capital tax 
is much more inefficient than other forms of taxation. 
In addition, Johansson et al. (2008) investigated the design of tax structures to 
support economic growth on the OECD countries using data on industrial sectors 
and individual firm.  
One reason that leads to inconclusive results for the effects of taxes is that they 
do not take the implications for the government budget constraint into account. 
Poot (2000) claimed that ―an increase in government spending or taxes has 
implications for public debt that are likely to affect the behaviour of firms or 
households so that the revenue and cost side of budgetary decisions should be 
considered simultaneously‖ (Poot, 2000, pp. 533). Some authors, like Barro (1990), 
found that taxes leads to a low rate of capital accumulation and economic growth 
because they create a wedge between net and gross returns on saving. 
2.8. Education spending and economic growth 
One of the most important decisions made by government authorities in every 
country is the amount of expenditures on education. This type of spending might 
help to enhance economic growth by increasing productivity, individual or social 
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improvement and development, or reduction of inequalities. The majority of 
previous studies (Landau, 1983; Barro, 1991; Evans & Karras, 1994; Hansson & 
Henrekson, 1994) indicated that there is significant positive impact of education 
spending on economic growth. However, we cannot make any generalisation since 
all these studies used different methodologies and several statistical proxies to 
measure the level of education spending. For instance, Barro (1992) used years of 
upper-level average schooling of the male workforce, while Hansson & Henrekson 
(1994) applied the education spending as a share of GDP. On the other hand, Evans 
& Karras (1994) deployed the elasticity of education expenditures. 
2.9. Gross capital formation and economic growth 
The gross capital formation is very important for the economy, because it 
contributes to the sustainable economic growth.  In theory, capital information is 
the fraction of present income saved and invested in order to enhance output and 
income. Gross fixed capital formation has two categories: gross private domestic 
investment and gross public domestic investment. Many authors (Beddies, 1999; 
Ghura & Hadjimichael, 1996; Ghura, 1997) found that capital formation had a 
significant impact on economic growth. While, Benos (2009), Levine & Renelt 
(1992) and Bond et al. (2004) found that the relationship between Gross capital 
formation has a positive effect on economic growth. 
2.10. Military spending and economic growth 
The study of Benoit (1973) was the starting point for many researchers to 
investigate the relationship and the interaction between military spending and 
economic growth. Benoit found evidence of a positive relationship in LDCs. There 
are a number of studies (Deger & Smith, 1983; Deger, 1986; Lim, 1983) that found 
empirical evidence of a negative relationship between military spending and 
economic growth. They focused on two kinds of trade-offs: the allocation effect 
(the guns and butter trade-off) and the growth effect (the guns vs. growth effect). 
Another strand of literature (Benoit, 1978; Kaldor, 1976: Kennedy, 1983: 
Weede, 1986a) found a positive relationship between military spending and 
economic growth. They suggested that military spending stimulates economic 
growth directly and indirectly by increasing the purchasing power, producing 
positive externalities, and finally enhancing aggregate demand. Moreover, military 
spending through the defence programs increases the employment, the education 
and technological training. Finally, several studies do not find any empirical 
evidence of the relationship between economic growth and military spending 
(Biswas & Ram, 1986; Hill, 1978; Mintz & Stevenson, 1995). 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data 
The endogenous growth models assume that fiscal instruments classified 
into 4 main types: productive and unproductive expenditures, distotrionary 
and non-distortionary taxation. According to Benos (2009) the theoretical 
literature is not clear about the clarification of the functional categories. In 
his empirical research he left the estimation results to determine if these 
categories are productive or not. We will use the classification of European 
Union about the fiscal variables as shown in Table 1 and will have a 
functional classification because it corresponds better to theoretical 
literature. 
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Table 1. Theoretical/Functional classification of Fiscal Policy Instruments 
Theoretical/Functional classification of Fiscal Policy Instruments  
Theoretical classification Functional classification 
Distortionary taxation Current taxes on income, wealth 
 Capital taxes 
 Actual social contribution 
Non-distortionary taxation Taxes on production and imports 
Productive / Unproductive 
expenditures 
Expenditure on education 
 Expenditure on health 
 Expenditure on housing-community amenities 
 Expenditure on environment protection 
 Expenditure on social protection 
 Expenditure on economic affairs 
 Expenditure on general public services 
 Expenditure on public order-safety 
 Expenditure on defence 
 Expenditure on recreation-culture-religion 
Source: Adapted from Benos (2009) 
 
We used annual unbalanced panel data of 15 European Union countries 
(Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Greece, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, the U.K), for the period 1995-
2008 that obtained from Eurostat. 
Table 2 demonstrates the basic descriptive statistics for the variables used in our 
estimations. For the variables definitions see Appendix. From the table we can see 
that growth rate of real GDP grew at about 0.04% per year. Government 
expenditures on public order safety (PUBLICORDER) and defence (DEFENC) 
were increase approximately 1.5% and 1.4 of GDP respectively. 
 
Table 2 : Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std Deviation Minimum Maximum 
ACTUALCON 11,322 4,299 1 18,6 
DEFENC 1,462 0,68 0,2 4 
DISTRICTTAX 26 4,828 16 38 
ECCONAFFAIRS 4,389 1,128 1,7 11,1 
EDUCAT 5,43 1,234 2,5 8,8 
EMPLOGROWTH 1,542 1,529 -1,3 8,5 
ENVIRONM 0,678 0,244 0,2 1,3 
EXPORTS 50,142 32,177 20 177,3 
GHY 14,281 2,342 7,5 18,2 
GINFAST 11,777 2,84 6,4 20,6 
GPROPERTRIGHT 2,981 0,8 1,1 5,2 
GROSSCAP 18,18 2,614 12,1 26,9 
HEALTH 6,146 1,097 3,4 8,4 
HOUSING 0,92 0,92 -0,3 6,3 
HUMANRESOURSE 17,224 4,94 7,2 28 
IMPORTS 46,551 25,615 20,1 143,8 
NETBOR -1,33 3,129 -9,7 6,8 
OPEN 96,734 57,65 44,4 321,1 
PUBLICORDER 1,519 0,401 0,6 2,6 
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PUBSERV 7,388 2,389 2,7 16 
RECREAT 1,106 0,397 0,2 2,3 
SOCIAL 18,25 3,816 9 26,6 
TAXCAPIT 0,247 0,197 0 1,5 
TAXIMPORTS 14,777 8,864 10,2 140,2 
TAXWEAL 14,591 5,447 6,4 31,7 
TOTGOVSPPEND 47,53 6,269 29,1 65,1 
YOUTH 5,966 11768,78 16 10045 
YG 4.63 3.87 -11.64 24.84 
Y0 42500 92168,44 8900 38600 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Government spending on education was 5.4% of GDP, while public spending 
on economic affairs (ECCONAFFAIRS) was around 4.4%. The largest component 
of public expenditures was the social spending (SOCIAL) with about 18.2% of 
GDP, while spending on health was 6.1% of GDP. Government spending on 
housing-community amenities (HOUSING), on recreation-culture-religion 
(RECREAT), on environment protection (ENVIRONM) were equal to 0.9%, 1.1% 
and 0.7% of GDP respectively. Finally, public spending of general public services 
(PUBSERV) was approximately 7.4% of GDP.  
These government expenditures, as we analysed in the theory of the previous 
chapter, were financed mainly by taxes. Taxes on income and wealth (TAXWEAL) 
and taxes on production and imports (TAXIMPORTS) were accounted for 
approximately 14.6% and 14.7% of GDP respectively. Taxes on social security 
contribution (ACTUALCON) amounted for 11.3% of GDP. Moreover, capital 
taxes accounted for only 0.2% of GDP. Finally, the budgets (NETBOR) were on 
deficit of approximately 1.3%. 
Most of the countries of our data set present large variation across countries and 
over time. The growth rate of real GDP ranges from -1.3% to 8.5% of GDP, public 
spending on defence was between 0.2% and 4%, while spending on recreation-
culture-religion was between 0.2 and 2.3%. Government spending on health was 
from 3.4% to 8.4% and spending on education ranges between 2.5% to 8.8% of 
GDP. Moreover, spending on social spending measured between 9% and 26% of 
GDP, while spending on environment protection ranges between 0.2% and 1.3%. 
Finally, taxes on income and wealth range between 6.4% and 31.7% of GDP, taxes 
on imports between 10.2% and 140.2%, capital taxes between 0% and 1.5% and 
finally we observe surplus of 6.8% and deficit of 9.7% 
In the specification of our model we follow the work of Kneller et al. (1999) 
and Benos (2005, 2009) with some changes. Firstly, we use the latest data for fiscal 
variables from Eurostat, after the change in the construction and classification of 
these variables after 2001. Secondly, we use data for general government and not 
for central government such as Kneller et al. (1999). Thirdly, we make a new 
classification of public expenditures into homogeneous groups in order to reduce 
the explanatory variables and increase the efficiency of our model and results since 
we have data for only 14 years. The new variables that we classify are the general 
government expenditure on human capital accumulation (GHY), which include 
general government spending on education (EDUCAT), on health (HEALTH), on 
housing and community amenities (HOUSING), on environment protection 
(ENVIRONM) and finally spending on recreation, culture and religion 
(RECREAT). This new variable represents the 14.3% of GDP and amounts from 
7.5% to 18.2%. 
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Moreover, we construct a new variable that represents the government 
expenditures on infrastructure (GINFAST), and includes government expenditures 
on economic affairs (ECONAFFAIRS) and expenditures on general public services 
(PUBLIC). Government expenditures on infrastructure represent approximately 
12% of GDP and ranges between 6.4% and 20.6%. Finally, in government 
spending size of budget constraint we construct another variable that correspond to 
government expenditures on property rights protection (PROPERTRIGHT) and 
contains expenditures on public order and safety (PUBLIC) and expenditures on 
defence (DEFENC). This variable represents approximately 3% of GDP and ranges 
between 1.1% and 5.2%. 
On the other side of budget, we construct the variable distortionary taxation 
(DISTRICTAX) which includes taxes on wealth and income (TAXWEAL), capital 
taxes (TAXCAPIT) and actual social contribution (ACTUALCON). This new 
variables corresponds to 26% of GDP and ranges between 16% and 38%.  We 
follow Benos (2009) and assume that non-distortionary taxes are the implicit 
financing elements of change in the rest of fiscal variables and therefore we omit it 
from ourregressions. Fourthly, we allow for differential growth impact of fiscal 
policy instruments across countries. 
With regard to non-fiscal variables we incorporate initial level of GDP to isolate 
possible convergence effects. We include employment growth and business 
investment in our model because labour and capital are very important factors of 
production in growth models. Moreover the employment growth helps to control 
for business cycle effects on growth. 
In order to take into account the growth effects of human capital in the economy 
we include the variable human recourses in science and technology 
(HUMANRESOURSE) which represents the persons who have completed tertiary 
education and are employed in science and technology occupations( professionals, 
technicians and associate professionals). Finally we include the sum of imports and 
exports of a country as a percentage of GDP (OPEN) and take into account external 
effects on the economy. 
3.2. Methodology 
Firstly, we estimate our models by Ordinary Least Squares and decide on the 
appropriate model specification by using the 𝑅2 -adjusted, Akaike Information 
Criterion and Swartz Bayesian information Criterion as selection criteria and taking 
under consideration the efficiency of the parameter estimations of the different 
models. Additionally, when we estimate our regressions, in order to avoid perfect 
collinearity, at least one of the fiscal variables is omitted. 
We apply also fixed and random effects models (See appendix 9) and carry out 
the F-tests and Hausman (1978) specification tests for the selection of the 
appropriate model. The main premise of performing the present study is the effect 
of fiscal variables to GDP per capita growth, but the association according to 
Benos (2009) does not mean that causality runs exclusively in one direction. He 
claimed that if this not taken into account, there will be obtained biased and 
inconsistent estimates. The modern approach to system instrumental variables 
estimation is based on the principle of generalized methods of moments (GMM), 
Wooldringe (2002) claimed that these methods have long history in statistics for 
obtaining simple parameter estimates when maximum likelihood estimation 
requires nonlinear optimization. We apply two estimators, the Arellano & Bond 
(1991) and Arellano & Bovver (1995) - Blundell & Bond (1998). In order to 
examine the validity of the instruments we use the Saran test. 
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4. Empirical results 
4.1. Public expenditures on human capital accumulation (GHY) 
From our empirical results we note that public expenditures on human capital 
accumulation seem to affect negative the economic growth statistically significant 
in the first round of our regressions (Table 3). These results are in contrast to the 
findings from previous researchers. One justification for this result is probably 
because we include spending on education, health, housing and community 
amenities, environment protection and spending on recreation, culture and religion. 
Some elements of them may have positive (education) and some others negative 
effect. Benos (2009) found no impact of this government spending on economic 
growth and stated that this happen probably because the effects of spending on 
human accumulation are non-linear. Moreover the observations that we have are 
not enough to include these variables separately in our models. 
In order to solve these problems we disaggregate public expenditures on human 
capital accumulation into public expenditures on education (EDUCAT) and the rest 
of expenditures on human accumulation to correct for possible aggregate bias. 
Moreover we multiply these two variables (GHY and EDUCAT) with initial level 
of human capital (HUMANRESOURSE0) and construct two new variables 
GHYHUM and EDUHUM. The findings support a significant positive impact of 
education spending on economic growth (as expecting) and negative impact from 
GHYHUM. The positive impact of education spending we found is consistent with 
empirical results made by Evans & Karras (1984), Baffes & Shan (1998), Hanson 
& Henrekson (1994), Landau (1983) and Barro (1991). Hence, we can conclude 
that the more educated is the population of a country, the more beneficial is an 
increase in government spending on education on economic growth. 
4.2. Public expenditures on infrastructure (GINFAST) 
Our empirical results indicate that an increase of government spending on 
infrastructure has a significant positive impact on the economic growth of a 
country. Barro (1990) implied that these types of spending imply positive 
externalities to private customers and increase the economic growth. The positive 
relationship maybe occurs also because these spending include spending on 
transportation, communication and energy. Government spending on infrastructure 
(GINFAST) includes government expenditures on economic affairs 
(ECONAFFAIRS) and expenditures on general public services (PUBLIC).  
Our empirical evidence is in accordance with Ratner (1983), Easterly & Rebelo 
(1993), Kocherlakota & Yi (1997), Lau & Sin (1997), Kneller et al. (1999), 
Angelopoulos et al. (2007) and Benos (2009). However, some other researchers 
such as Landau (1985), Evans & Karras (1994) and Devarajan et al. (1996) found a 
significantly negative effect of this type of spending on economic growth, while 
Landau (1986), Barro (1991), Hanson & Henrekson (1994), Hulten & Schwab 
(1991), Tatom (1991; 1993) and Holtz-Eakin (1994), Garcia-Mila, McGuire & 
Porter (1996) found inconclusive, complex, or no effect between economic growth 
and infrastructure spending. 
Easterly & Rebelo (1993) found a positive impact of investment in transport 
and communication on economic growth. Canning et al. (1994) found evidence 
which supported a positive effect of telephones on economic growth. Similarly, 
Sanchez-Robles (1998) found a positive effect of road length and electricity 
generating capacity in growth. Benos (2009) used an alternative explanatory 
variable to examine the relationship between economic growth and infrastructure 
spending, he multiplied the variable GINFAST with the initial length of motorways 
of each country (measured in kilometres). He implied that the infrastructure 
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spending is more effective on economic growth in countries with higher initial 
infrastructure stock. 
4.3.Public expenditures on property rights protection 
(GPROPERTRIGHT) 
In our regressions the government expenditures on property rights protections 
include spending on defence (DEFENC) and spending on public order safety 
(PUBLIC). Our empirical results from the first round of regressions implied a 
strongly negative relationship between these two variables. These results are in 
contrast with the theory of Barro and Sala-I Martin that this category of 
expenditures that supports to the protection of property right increases the 
possibility that the citizens keep this right to their goods and services. Benos (2009) 
found a significant positive impact and concluded that the increased expenditures 
on public order and safety, the stronger the incentive agents have to accumulate 
human/physical capital and increase economic growth.  
On the second round of our regressions (Table 4) we aggregate defence 
spending (DEFENC) from spending on property right protection and multiply it 
with the initial per capita income (Y0) and construct a new variable DEFENC0. In 
our new empirical results we do not found any relationship between economic 
growth and defence spending. Our results are in contrast with Antonakis & 
Karavidas (1990), Antonakis (1997), Andreou et al. (2002), Kollias (2004), who 
found a significant negative impact of military spending on economic growth. 
4.4. Social spending 
Our empirical results imply a non-significant relationship between government 
spending on social protection and economic growth, which is consistent with the 
previous mixed results of theoretical and empirical work of this subject. Feldstein 
(1974) suggested a depressing effect of redistributive policies on physical capital 
accumulation and growth, while Cashin (1995), Belletini & Ceroni (2000) implied 
a positive relationship between social spending and growth. Atkinson (1999) made 
a survey on literature and found mixed results for the relationship between the size 
of welfare state and growth, while Bleaney et al. (2001) included the social 
spending in unproductive spending and found insignificant effect on growth. The 
positive impact is in contrast with studies made by Gwartney et al.(1998), Hansson 
& Henrekson (1994), Atkinson (1999), Nördstrom (1992) and Weede (1986b; 
1991). 
In our second round of regressions we included a new explanatory variable, 
SOCIAL0, which is social expenditure multiplied by initial per capita income (Y0). 
We found again insignificant relationship between these this variable and economic 
growth. 
4.5. Government revenues 
Examining the other side of budget, we found a statistically negative impact of 
distortionary taxes (DISTRICTAX) on economic growth. This is consistent with 
the previous studies such as Barro (1990), Jones et al. (1993), Turnovsky (2000), 
Helms (1985), Canto & Webb (1987), Kocherlakota & Yi (1997) and Garrison & 
Lee (1995). In most recent studies that tested both sides of budget (Kneller et al. 
(1999) and Bleaney et al. (2001)), support our empirical results.In the other 
explanatory variable that we include in our regressions, budget deficit or surplus 
(NETBOR), we find no significant impact of NETBOR on economic growth, while 
the previous empirical results are mixed. Our results are in contrast to the Ricardian 
Equivalence which implies that since a current surplus will finance future deficits 
through cuts in distortionary taxation or increases in productive spending, it causes 
an increase in growth and investment. 
Turkish Economic Review 
 TER, 2(4), D. Paparas et. al., p.239-268. 
258 
258 
The Ricardian equivalence suggests that a cut in present taxes leads to higher 
future taxes with the same value as the initial cut. This happen because the 
government cannot change the present values of taxes but can change the present 
spending. If we suppose that the demand for goods depends on the present 
expected taxes, as a result its household subtract from the expected income this 
expected taxes to be in a wealth position.  Therefore, the government has to change 
the present taxes but cannot do that if doesn’t change the present spending. So the 
effects from budget deficits and taxes to the economy are the same, that’s why the 
name ―equivalence‖. Barro (1974) made an analysis whether an increase in 
government dept constitutes an increase in perceived household wealth. He 
examines the effect of finite lives and found that the households would act as they 
were infinitely lived and there would be no marginal net-wealth effect of bonds 
(that happens because the intergenerations transfers). Feldstein (1974) accepted the 
conclusion of Barro (1974) that government dept will not add to net wealth in a 
model with operative intergenerational transfers ,but only in static economy and he 
said that is incorrect in economy that growing. 
When we allow for non-linear growth effects we find a positive relationship 
between NETBOR and economic growth, which is in contrast to Ricardian 
Equivalence. This is in accordance to Benos (2009). The justification of our 
findings probably lies in the fact that most of the countries in our data set do not 
have excessive budget deficits. Moreover we have to put emphasis on the fact that 
when a country runs a deficit for many years will require more distortionary taxes 
in the future (has negative impact on economic growth). 
4.5. Non-fiscal policy variables 
As we mentioned before, we include employment growth (EMPLOGROWTH) 
and business investment (GROSSCAP) in our model because labour and capital are 
very important factors of production in growth models. Moreover, the employment 
growth helps to control for business cycle effects on growth. In our empirical 
results we do not find a significant impact of employment on economic growth, but 
when we allow for non-linear growth effects we find a strongly positive impact. 
Azariadis & Drazen (1990) concluded that returns to education tend to be higher in 
countries with better educated labour force. Benos (2009) stated that ―employment 
controls for business cycle effects on growth, so we can be reasonably confident, 
that the estimated growth effects on the rest of the variables included in our model 
are not contaminated by short-run factors‖ (Benos, 2009, pp. 18). Concerning the 
gross fixed capital formation by the private sector as a percentage of GDP we find 
in both rounds of our regressions no significant impact on economic growth which 
is in contrast to Benos (2009), Levine & Renelt (1992), Bond et al. (2004) who 
found positive effect. 
In order to test the impact of human capital on economic growth we include the 
explanatory variable HUMANRESOURSE which represents the persons who have 
completed tertiary education and are employed in science and technology 
occupations (professionals, technicians and associate professionals). In both rounds 
of our regressions we do not find any evidence of impact on economic growth. 
Finally we include the sum of imports and exports of a country as a percentage of 
GDP (OPEN) and take into account external effects on the economy. Our empirical 
results do not support any evidence of relationship between OPEN and economic 
growth. 
The relationship between trade openness and economic growth is very complex. 
The empirical results of previous models such as Romer (1990), Rivera-Batiz & 
Romer (1991) are diversified and do not follow pattern on their results. 
Additionally, another probable reason for mixed results is the specific country 
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factors such as different technologies across different countries (Young, 1991; 
Lucas, 1988).  
 
Model 1 (first round of regressions) 
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+ 𝑎11𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 (−𝑏) 
 
(2) 
Table 3. Results of Model 1 
 ESTIMATES  
Explanatory  variables OLS 
FIXED 
EFFECTS 
A-B1 A-B2 B-B1 A-B3 B-B2 B-B3 
GHY -0,166 -1,167 -0,85 -0,83 -0,83 0,69 -0,63 -0,68 
t-statistic -1,2 -2,96* -3,776* -3,74* -3,54* -3,1* -2,84* -2,95* 
GINFAST 0,327 0,514 0,32 0,301 0,386 0,433 0,52 0,44 
t-statistic 2,428* 1,27 1,69 1,714 1,927* 1,99* 2,3 1,944* 
GPROPERTRIGHT 0,65 0,474 -3,03 -2,93 -2,99 -2,1 -1,93 -2,011 
t-statistic 1,116 0,39 -3,078* -3,01* -3,03* -2,411* -2,16* -2,28* 
GROSSCAP -0,248 -0,11 0,26 0,25 0,255 0,006 0,002 -0,005 
t-statistic -1,87* -0,53 1,56 1,53 1,51 0,004 0,145 -0,003 
HOUMANRESOURSE -0,123 -0,158 -0,117 -0,176 -0,18 -0,25 -0,28 -0,258 
t-statistic -1,7* -0,92 -1,51 -1,49 -1,55 -2,26* -2,39* -2,18* 
NETBOR 0,5 0,3 0,311 0,31 0,366 0,364 0,43 0,355 
t-statistic 3,25* 1,02 1,962* 1,981* 2,165* 2,12* 2,44* 1,968* 
OPEN -0,002 0,02 -0,022 -0,023 -0,024 0,005 0,01 0,008 
t-statistic -0,3 1,03 -0,75 -0,78 -0,84 0,22 0,37 0,338 
DISTRICTTAX -0,353 -0,37 -0,24 -0,227 -0,271 -0,29 -0,4 -0,29 
t-statistic -2,957* -1,52 -1,97* -1,81* -2,24* -1,76 -2,3* -1,71 
EMPLOGROWTH 1,01 0,75 0,32 0,32 0,318 0,78 0,75 0,86 
t-statistic 4,173* 2,61* 1,37 1,366 1,33 3,929* 3,72* 3,638* 
SOCIAL  0,079 0,037 -1,12 -1,091 -1,068 -0,17 -0,106 -0,12 
t-statistic 0,56 0,1 -3,86* -3,7* -3,67* -0,61* 0,7161* -0,44* 
C 15,01 24,43 
      
t-statistic 2,631* 2,03 
      
Observations 185 185 134 134 134 134 134 134 
R-Squared 0.357 0.434 
      
J-Stat 
  
68 72 71 72 69 70 
Instrument rank 
  
73 73 73 73 73 73 
Hausman test (F-test) 
 
1.56 
      
Sargan Test 
  
0.31 0.204 0.228 0.2 0.28 0.254 
Autocorellation of 2
nd
 
order   
0.864 0.856 0.55 0.57 0.865 0.254 
Note: Dependent variable is the GDP per capita growth in country i (i=1,15) during the period t 
(t=1995-2008). We also report the t-statistics and * devote 5% level significance. We employed the 
Hausman specification test in order to examine the significance of the above correlation and shows 
that the random effect estimator is not appropriate ( 𝑥2 = 17,95, while the critical value for 10 d.f and 
a=0.005 is 𝑥2 = 18.30> 17,95). When we applied the Likelihood ratio specification test for fixed 
effects we found that the fixed effect estimator is appropriate ( F-stat=1,56 while the critical value for 
14, 160 d.f is 3,04). The null hypothesis is that the difference between RE/FE is not systematic. 
Additionally, we deployed the Sargan test in order to test on the validity of the instruments, with the 
null hypothesis that the instruments that we used in our regressions are not correlated with the 
residuals. If we cannot reject the null hypothesis the instruments are valid, if we reject it means that at 
least one of our instruments is correlated with the error term (residuals). We cannot reject the null 
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hypothesis. Finally, we found that the errors exhibit no second order serial correlation. FE: fixed 
effects, RE: random effects, A-B: Arellano & Bond (1991) estimator, B-B: Arellano & Bover (1995) - 
Blundell & Bond (1998) estimator. 
 
Model 2. (second round of regressions) 
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𝑕
𝑏=0
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𝑗
𝑏=0
(−𝑏)
+ 𝛽8  𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿0
𝑘
𝑏=0
(−𝑏)
+ 𝛽9 𝐻𝑂𝑈𝑀𝐴𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝑆𝐸
𝑙
𝑏=0
 −𝑏 + 𝛽10  𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶0
𝑚
𝑏=0
 −𝑏 
+ 𝛽11  𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐸𝑁𝐶0
𝑛
𝑏=0
 −𝑏 + 𝛽12𝐶 + 𝛽13𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 (−𝑏)
+ 𝛽14𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡(−𝑏) 
 
 
Table 4. Results of Model 2 
 ESTIMATES  
Explanatory  variables OLS  FIXED 
EFFECTS  
GMM1 GMM2 GMM3 GMM4 GMM5 GMM6 
GHY0 0,00006        
t-statistic -3,49*        
GHYHUM 0,00003 -0,0001 -9E-05 -9E-05 -9E-05 -5E-05 -5E-05 -5E-05 
t-statistic 1,56 -3,34* -3,58* -3,54* -3,52* -2,28* -1,99* -2,22* 
EDU0 0,0001        
t-statistic 2,33*        
EDUCAHUM -9E-05 0,00001 0,00006 0,00006 6E-05 0,00004 0,00003 4E-05 
t-statistic -1,48 0,16 2,06* 1,94* 2,08* 1,31 1,11 1,33 
DEFENC0 -4E-06 0,00003 -0,0001 -0,0001 -0,0001 -7E-05 -7E-05 -5E-05 
t-statistic -0,184 0,48 -1,38 -1,466 -1,32 -1,13 -1,11 -0,74 
SOCIAL0 0,00002 -0,0000008 -5E-05 -5E-05 -5E-05 0,00002 0,00002 2E-05 
t-statistic 7,89* -0,03 -3,07* -3,12* -2,93* 1,34 1,53 1,53 
HUMANRESOURSE -0,22 -0,16 -0,14 -0,143 -0,14 -0,28 -0,27 -0,31 
t-statistic -4,63* -0,91 -1,33 -1,28 -1,34 -2,44* -2,13* -2,6* 
PUBLIC0 -2E-05 0,0003 -0,0001 -0,0001 -0,0001 -0,0001 -0,0001 -0,0001 
t-statistic -1,4 2,17* -1,58 -1,49 -1,69 -1,47 -1,55 -1,19 
DISTRICTAX -0,33 -0,24 -0,14 -0,153 -0,154 -0,3 -0,3 -0,48 
t-statistic -7,85* -1,17 -1,4 -1,44 -1,38 -2,04* -1,96* -3,1 
NETBOR 0,34 0,12 0,15 0,141 0,167 0,3 0,25 0,364 
t-statistic 5,72* 0,58 1,33 1,18 1,4 2,22* 1,77 2,59* 
EMPLOGROWTH 0,75 0,91 0,47 0,5 0,455 1,001 1,16 0,99 
t-statistic 6,81* 3,23* 2,34* 2,14* 2,25* 4,86* 4,81* 4,74* 
GROSSCAP 0,153 -0,15 0,32 0,32 0,33 -0,02 -0,05 0,01 
t-statistic 2,36* -0,75 2,02* 1,79 2,06* -0,16 -0,32 00,06 
OPEN 0,001 0,019 -0,03 -0,03 -0,03 0,0156 0,01 0,01 
t-statistic 0,364 0,65 -1,132 -1,151 -1,124 0,55 0,56 0,64 
C 12,16 26,33       
t-statistic 6,82* 2,4*       
Observations 185  185 134 134 134 134 134       134 
R-Squared 0.302 0.435       
J-Stat   72 72 73 69 66        68 
Instrument rank   74 74 74 74 74        74 
Hausman test (F-test)  1.56       
Sargan Test   0.23 0.24 0.206 0.312 0.407   0.342 
Autocorellation of 2
nd
 
order 
  0.93 0.934 0.929 0.647 0.632     0.63 
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5. Conclusion 
Nowadays, the public finances of most countries in the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) are in the worst position since the industrial revolution. The main 
objective of this chapter is to highlight the public finances, fiscal policy and 
economic growth in the EU-15, and make an attempt to determine which of the 
fiscal policy instruments enhance economic growth. We included both sides of 
budget, spending and taxation, in our regressions and used the most recent dataset 
data for fiscal variables from Eurostat. The composition of both spending and 
revenues is very important according to endogenous growth models. We make a 
new classification of public expenditures into homogeneous groups in order to 
reduce the explanatory variables and increase the efficiency of our model and 
results since we have data for only 14 years. In our empirical analysis we included 
OLS, fixed effects models, random effects models and GMM estimators, the 
Arellano & Bond (1991) and the Arellano & Bover (1995) - Blundell & Bond 
(1998) estimators. 
Firstly, on the first round of our regressions we find a negative impact of 
spending on human capital accumulation on economic growth. We imply that  
these results made probably because we include spending on education, health, 
housing and community amenities, environment protection and spending on 
recreation, culture and religion, some elements of them have positive (education) 
and some others negative effect. In order to solve these problems we disaggregate 
public expenditures on human capital accumulation into public expenditures on 
education (EDUCAT) and the rest of expenditures on human accumulation to 
correct for possible aggregate bias. Our findings support a significant impact of 
education spending on economic growth (as expecting) and negative impact from 
GHYHUM. The positive impact of education spending we found is consistent with 
Evans & Karras (1984), Baffes & Shan (1998), Hanson & Henrekson (1994), 
Landau (1983) and Barro (1991). This type of spending might help to enhance 
economic growth by increasing productivity, individual or social improvement and 
development, or reduction of inequalities. Hence, we can conclude that the more 
educated is the population of a country, the more beneficial is an increase in 
government spending on education on economic growth. 
Our empirical results also indicate that an increase on government spending on 
infrastructure has a significant positive impact on the economy growth of a 
country. This positive relationship is existed probably because these spending 
include spending on transportation, communication and energy.  
Additionally, in our regressions the variable government spending on property 
rights protections include spending on defence (DEFENC) and spending on public 
order safety (PUBLIC). Our empirical results from the first round of regressions 
imply a strongly negative relationship between these two variables. There are a 
number of studies such as Deger & Smith (1983), Deger (1986), Faini et al. (1984), 
Lim (1983) which found empirical evidence of a negative relationship between 
military spending and economic growth. They focused on two kinds of trade-offs: 
the allocation effect (the guns and butter trade-off) and the growth effect (the guns 
vs. growth effect). However, on the second round of our regressions we aggregate 
defence spending from spending on property right protection and we did not find 
any relationship between economic growth and defence spending. 
Moreover, we find a non-significant relationship between government spending 
on social protection and economic growth, which is consistent with the previous 
mixed results of the theoretical and empirical work of this subject. Government 
spending on social protection can have a positive impact on economic growth of a 
country through many channels. Firstly, government funds can used in order to 
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finance the health or education systems, encourage risk taking, and promote 
participation of individuals in the labour market. However, if tax-payers realise that 
when government revenues increased, more funds will be used on social 
protection, they will have less incentive to work and save.  Furthermore, we find a 
statistically negative impact of distortionary taxes on economic growth. This is 
consistent with the previous studies such as Barro (1990), Jones et al. (1993), 
Turnovsky (2000), Helms (1985), Canto & Webb (1987), Kocherlakota & Yi 
(1997) and Garrison & Lee (1995). The negative impact occurs probably from the 
distortions to choice and the disincentive effects.  
In the other explanatory variable that we includ in our regressions, budget 
deficit or surplus, we find no significant impact on economic growth, while the 
previous empirical results are mixed. Our results are in contrast to the Ricardian 
Equivalence which implies that since a current surplus will finance future deficits 
through cuts in distortionary taxation or increases in productive spending, it causes 
an increase in growth and investment. On the second round of regressions, when 
we allow for non-linear growth effects we find a positive relationship with deficits 
and economic growth, which is in contrast with Ricardian Equivalence. The same 
conclusion found in the study of Benos (2009). Our findings are probably due to 
the fact that most of the countries in our data set do not have excessive budget 
deficits. Moreover, we have to emphasize the fact that when a country runs a 
deficit for many years will require more distortionary taxes in the future (has 
negative impact on economic growth). 
We also include the employment growth and business investment in our model 
because labour and capital are very important factors of production in growth 
models. The employment growth helps to control for business cycle effects on 
growth. In our empirical results we do not find a significant impact of employment 
on economic growth, but when we allow for non-linear growth effects we find a 
strongly positive impact. Finally, the gross capital formation is very important for 
the economy, it contributes to sustainable economic growth. In theory, capital 
formation is the fraction of present income saved and invested in order to enhance 
output and income. However, we found that gross fixed capital formation of the 
private sector as a percentage of GDP in both rounds of our regressions, has no 
significant impact on economic growth which is in contrast to Benos (2009), 
Levine & Renelt (1992).  
In order to test the impact of human capital on economic growth, we include the 
explanatory variable which represents the persons who have completed tertiary 
education and are employed in science and technology occupations (professionals, 
technicians and associate professionals). In both rounds of our regressions we do 
not find any evidence of impact on economic growth. Finally we include the sum 
of imports and exports of a country as a percentage of GDP and take into account 
external effects on the economy. Our empirical results do not support any evidence 
of relationship between OPEN and economic growth. The relationship between 
trade opens and economic growth is one of the most debated issues in economics, 
since this relationship is very complex. The empirical results of endogenous 
models such as Romer (1990), Rivera-Batiz & Romer (1991) are diversified and do 
not have common pattern on their results. Additionally, probably one reason for 
mixed results is the specific country factors such as different technologies across 
different countries.  
An update of the dataset used including extended dataset which will include 
more years and countries, would be considerably useful and insightful. 
Additionally, an examination of each spending or revenue category in detail is 
warranted. Governments need to know whether their public activities serve as an 
incentive to growth or if they are an obstacle, because the development of 
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appropriate fiscal policies could lead to a persistent increase of economic growth. 
Thus, they have to determine which of their activities are productive or 
unproductive. 
 
Notes 
 
iKnerell et al. (2001) concluded that if fiscal variables are strictly exogenous, the evidence that based 
on cross-section or static panel approaches may be misleading. 
ii Helms (1985) used annual data for 48 states for the period 1965-1979 and used as explanatory 
variables taxes, public expenditures and demographic and labour force characteristics. The key 
feature of this approach was the fact that he recognized that is meaningful to evaluate the effects of 
expenditures or taxes in isolation and claimed that both the sources and the uses of funds must be 
considered. 
 
Appendix 1. Variable definitions 
Y: GDP at market prices, Euro per inhabitant (at 1995 prices and exchange rates) 
YG: growth rate of real GDP per capita equal to ln𝑌𝑡 − ln 𝑌𝑡−1 
Y0: initial GDP at market prices, Euro per inhabitant (at 1995 prices and exchange rates) 
EDUCAT: General government expenditure on Education (Percentage of GDP) 
HEALTH: General government expenditure on Health (Percentage of GDP) 
HOUSING: General government expenditure on Housing and Community amenities 
(Percentage of GDP) 
ENVIRONM: General government expenditure on Environment Protection (Percentage ofGDP) 
RECREAT: General government expenditure on Recreation, Culture and Religion (Percentage of GDP) 
SOCIAL: General government expenditure on Social protection (Percentage of GDP) 
ECCONAFFAIRS: General government expenditure on Economic Affairs (Percentage of GDP) 
PUBSERV: General government expenditure on General Public Services (Percentage of GDP) 
PUBLICORDER: General government expenditure on Public Order and Safety (Percentage of GDP) 
DEFENC: General government expenditure on Defence (Percentage of GDP) 
TAXWEAL: Current taxes on income, wealth (Percentage of GDP) 
TAXCAPIT: Capital taxes (Percentage of GDP) 
TAXIMPORTS: Taxes on production and imports (Percentage of GDP) 
ACTUALCON: Actual social contributions (Percentage of GDP) 
DISTRICTTAX: Distortionary taxation as share of GDP (TIWY+ CAPTY+ ACSCY) 
NETBOR: Net lending (+)/Net borrowing (-) under the EDP (Excessive Deficit Procedure) (Percentage of GDP) 
GHY: EDUCAT+HEALTH+HOUSING+ENVIRONM+RECREAT, General government expenditure on human 
capital accumulation (Percentage of GDP) 
GINFAST: ECCONAFFAIRS + PUBSERV, General government expenditure on infrastructure (Percentage of 
GDP) 
GPROPERTRIGHT: DEFENC+ PUBLICORDER, General government expenditure on property rights protection 
(Percentage of GDP) 
DISTRICTTAX: TAXWEAL+ TAXCAPIT+ ACTUALCON: Distortionary taxation (Percentage of GDP) 
YOUTH: Youth education attainment level - total - Percentage of the population aged 20 to 24 having completed 
at least upper secondary education 
HUMANRESOURSE: Human recourses in science and technology-core, i.e. persons who have completed tertiary 
education and are employed in S&T19 occupations, percentage of active population 
EMPLOGROWTH: Employment growth - total - Annual percentage change in total employed population 
GROSSCAP: Business investment - Gross fixed capital formation by the private sector as a percentage of GDP 
EXPORTS: Exports of goods and services (Percentage of GDP) 
IMPORTS: Imports of goods and services (Percentage of GDP) 
OPEN: EXPORTS+IMPORTS, index of openness 
YOUTH0: initial YOUTH 
HUMANRESOURSE0: initial HUMANRESOURSE 
EDUCATY0: EDUCAT*Y0 
GHYY0: GHY*Y0 
EDUCATYOUTH0: EDUCAT*YOUTH0 
GHYYOUTH0: GHY*YOUTH0 
EDUCATHUMANRESOURSE0: EDUCAT*HUMANRESOURSE0 
GHYHUMANRESOURSE0: GHY*HUMANRESOURSE0 
DEFENCY0: DEFENC*Y0 
PUBLICORDERY0: PUBLICORDER*Y0 
SOCIALY0: SOCIAL*Y0 
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